[DOWNLOAD] "Guy F. Atkinson Co. Et Al. v. Fimian. Guy" by Court of Appeals of Georgia ~ Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Guy F. Atkinson Co. Et Al. v. Fimian. Guy
- Author : Court of Appeals of Georgia
- Release Date : January 04, 1951
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 64 KB
Description
R. U. Fimian and W. P. Musgrave sued Guy F. Atkinson Company and J.A. Jones Construction Company for damages arising from an alleged breach of an oral contract of employment. The facts and circumstances of each case, while differing in particulars, were substantially the same, and the cases were tried together. The plaintiffs alleged substantially that they were employed in Georgia in their respective capacities earning certain sums of money monthly and were secure and permanently situated in their jobs. The defendants through their agent, one Davidson, sought to persuade the plaintiffs to accept employment with the defendants in the State of Washington, and, after repeated attempts, did persuade them orally to accept such employment. Relying upon the promises of the said Davidson made on behalf of the defendants that the employment would last three to five years, at a specified salary with certain other specified emoluments, the plaintiffs resigned their jobs in Georgia and moved themselves, their families and personal effects to the State of Washington and entered into the employment of the defendants. Thereafter, some six or seven months after they entered the defendants' employ, they were without cause discharged. They have ever since held themselves in readiness to perform their services for the defendants but the defendants have continuously, since the date of plaintiffs' discharge, failed and refused to employ the plaintiffs in any capacity whatsoever, thus causing the plaintiffs certain damages specifically set out. The defendants answered, admitting the joint venture and the authority of Davidson to act for them in employing the plaintiffs, but denied that the plaintiffs were employed for any specified period of time; and alleged by way of plea that the petition on its face alleged an oral contract of employment not to be performed within one year from the date of making, and that it was therefore within the purview of the statute of frauds. The plaintiffs demurred to this latter allegation of the answer on the ground that it was irrelevant, immaterial, and that it did not add anything to any defense otherwise stated in the answer ""in that the petition shows on its face that the oral contract is valid and enforceable under 20-402 of the Georgia Code."" The trial court sustained this demurrer and struck that portion of the defendants' answer pleading the statute of frauds. This ruling was unexcepted to. Thereafter the defendants filed an amendment to their answer adding paragraph 21 as follows: ""That all of the acts performed under the contract alleged by plaintiff were performed in the State of Washington and all of the acts not performed but intended to be performed thereunder were to be performed solely in the State of Washington and that the rights of the parties are therefore to be determined by the law of said State of Washington, which law reads as follows: 'In the following cases, specified in this section, any agreement, contract, and promise shall be void, unless such agreement, contract or promise or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized, that is to say: 1. Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed in one year from making thereof; . . .' Remington Rev. Stat., Sec. 5825, Pierce Code, 1939, § 7745."" It was alleged that the said statute was of full force and effect at the time the alleged contract was entered into, and at the time the acts performed by the defendants were performed, and as construed by the highest court of the State of Washington such statute is applicable in each and every instance without regard to performance or part performance, and same constitutes a full and complete bar to any right of recovery by the plaintiff herein.